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In this paper, we examine the applicability of Mayer, Schoorman, and Davis’ 1995 Integrative 
Model of Organizational Trust for modeling citizens’ trust in their government.  We assess this 
via an empirical evaluation using country-level 2010 survey data collected in four Western 
Trans-Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mali, and Nigeria).  Our fundamental result is that 
the data and analyses support the Mayer et al. model, though our results also suggest some 
modifications.  In particular, we find that there are two separate dimensions to ability and 
benevolence/integrity, and our models suggest the existence of a new factor in models of 
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Exploring the Integrative Model of Organizational Trust as a Framework for Understanding  
 
Trust in Government 
 
 Multiple social science perspectives state that trust is critical to human interaction. 
For example, psychologists suggest “trust is one of the most important components—and 
perhaps the most essential ingredient—for the development and maintenance of … well-
functioning relationships” (Simpson, 2007a, p. 587).  Similarly, commentators from the field of 
international relations have stated that trust within the international system is “the underpinning 
of all human contact and institutional interaction” (Blind, 2006, p. 3).  Organizational 
management perspectives reach a similar conclusion about the cross-disciplinary importance of 
trust studies (e.g. Colquitt, Scott & LePine, 2007).  Even American military perspectives from 
the counterinsurgency battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that generating trust between 
American service members and local populations is more important than kinetics and force. For 
example, David Kilcullen, the noted Australian counterinsurgency expert states, trust building is 
the military’s “true main effort: everything else is secondary” (Kilcullen, 2010, p. 37).  
This manuscript is the first to explore the utility of Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman’s 
(1995) Integrative Model of Organizational Trust for understanding citizen trust in government.  
Mayer et al.’s Integrative Model of Organizational Trust has been used to explain interpersonal 
trust outcomes in the business world (Davis, Schoorman, Mayer, & Tan, 2000), the medical 
community (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 1996), psychology (Simpson, 2007a, b), and others 
(Colquitt, et al. 2007).  Despite the overwhelming utility of the Mayer model for understanding 
interpersonal trust generation in multiple contexts, it has, to our knowledge, never been used to 
understand citizen trust in government.  This is surprising since Mayer and colleagues (e.g. 
Schoorman et al., 2007) claim that their model is robust for understanding an individual’s trust in 
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organizations, though they tend to think of trust in business organizations as opposed to 
governments.  As Mayer and colleagues noted, “the 1995 framework is fairly robust across levels 
of analysis” (Schoorman et al., 2007, p. 345).  From their perspective, the same variables that 
impact trust between people “also affect the extent to which an organization will be trusted” by 
people (Schoorman et al., 2007, p. 345).  
This paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we describe Mayer et al.’s 
Integrative Model of Organizational Trust and how elements of the framework can be applied to 
understanding citizen trust in government.  We also discuss existing research on trust in 
government that, despite not using the Mayer model as an organizing framework, appears to 
support the Mayer et al. concept. Subsequently, we describe an exploratory analysis of survey 
data from four countries in the Trans-Sahel region of Africa (Senegal, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, 
and Mali).  In this section, we first describe basic details of each nation surveyed followed by our 
analysis of whether the Integrative Model of Organizational Trust is appropriate for 
understanding citizen reports of trust in government.  Finally, we conclude with a discussion of 
our results and recommendations for future research. 
Background 
 Multiple theoretical frameworks, across disciplines, attempt to explain how trust is 
generated. For example, Wieselquist et al. (1999) propose a trust generation theory based in 
psychology, often used to explain trust in romantic relationships, that explains how trust is 
generated between two people. Simpson (2007a, 2007b) proposes a dyadic theory of trust 
generation that focuses on the impact of personality variables across multiple stages of the trust 
generation process.  Hardin (2006) proposes a view based in political philosophy that helps 
explain how people have developed trust across time. Combs and Blincoe (2013) have proposed 
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a new theoretical framework specifically designed to understand how trust is generated cross 
culturally, with an aim towards understanding trust on the battlefield.  
 While each of these trust models is useful, perhaps the most celebrated social science 
model of trust generation is Mayer et al.’s now classic Integrative Model of Organizational Trust 
(Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995).  Developed in the mid-1990’s to organize a very disjointed 
social sciences trust literature, Mayer et al.’s model has now received extensive supporting 
empirical treatment and, by 2007, has been cited over a thousand times (Schoorman, Mayer & 
Davis, 2007).  
Integrative Model of Organizational Trust 
In 1995 Mayer and colleagues introduced their Integrative Model of Organizational 
Trust.  Trust, from Mayer et al.’s perspective, is “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to 
the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular 
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” 
(Mayer et al., 1995, p. 712).  According to their framework, as shown in Figure 1, trust is a result 
of trustworthiness. Trustworthiness, in this case, is a function of the trustor’s (the person doing 
the trusting) perceptions of the trustee’s (the person who would be trusted) ability, benevolence, 
and integrity (each explained in more detail in the next subsection).  These components of 
trustworthiness, along with a person’s dispositional propensity to trust, theoretically predict the 
level of trust a trustor has in a trustee.  The Mayer et al. model is a feedback loop, where trust is 
tested in a risk-taking situation, an outcome is observed, and then the trustor’s assessment of the 
trustee is subsequently updated. 
Mayer et al.’s model was originally proposed to explain trust in business relationships. 
For example, the process in Figure 1 was designed to explain when an employee might trust a 
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supervisor. If the employee perceives the supervisor as having sufficient ability, benevolence, 
and integrity then the employee is more likely to trust the supervisor and be willing to be 
vulnerable to his or her direction, leadership, etc.   
Components and Definitions Within the Integrative Model of Organizational Trust 
As noted, Mayer et al. (1995, p. 717) suggest that trustworthiness is made up of ability, 
benevolence, and integrity. This section characterizes each of these trustworthiness elements and 
provides research examples indicating that each has an impact on trust in government. The 
section concludes with a brief example of how the overall framework could play out regarding 
trust in government.  
Mayer et al. (p. 717) define ability as “that group of skills, competencies, and 
characteristics that enable a party to have influence within some specific domain.” Essentially, 
ability is a trustor’s perception of a person or organization’s ability to successfully complete a 
task. The impact of this trustworthiness component on trust makes intuitive sense.  A trustor 
would not be willing to make themselves vulnerable to the actions of a trustee if the trustee is 
incompetent to achieve some relevant task.  Of course, as Combs and Blincoe (2013, p. 13) note, 
“ability varies from domain to domain and situation to situation.”  At a personal trust level, an 
auto mechanic might be very good at repairing domestic cars, but have little background with 
foreign cars.  As such, a trustor’s sense of a trustee’s ability to repair his or her car will clearly 
vary across situations, as will a trustor’s overall trust in the trustee.  
From an organizational standpoint, the degree to which a person believes a business or 
government is trustworthy, and therefore trusts the business or government, should also depend 
on the ability of the organization in question.  For example, trust in an auto manufacturer is 
probably dependent, to a degree, upon the organization’s ability to produce a quality product.  
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That is, people probably ask themselves some variant of the question: Can this manufacturer get 
the job done? Similarly, trust in government is probably dependent, to a degree, upon the 
government’s ability to produce things like effective security, infrastructure, and economic 
growth.  Like the auto manufacturer example, people probably ask themselves some variant of 
the question: Can this government get the job done? 
Multiple research projects, often from the field of political science, have examined the 
impact of citizen’s perception of government ability on reports of citizen’s trust in government.1  
For example, Blind (2006) points out that a government’s ability to provide security and services 
impacts citizens’ trust in government.  Blind also states that a sense of government 
professionalism and competence has much the same effect.  Hetherington (1998) similarly points 
out that a number of perspectives on government trust are based on perceptions of government 
efficiency.  As he puts it: 
Because people are likely to trust things they perceive to be working 
effectively, the quality of policy outcomes should also help explain trust. 
… Public perceptions of the government's ability to solve problems that 
are personally most important should have a strong bearing on political 
trust (Hetherington, 1998, p. 794). 
Hetherington (2006, p. 5) also states, “Most Americans simply do not think the 
government is capable of doing the job [referring to a number of policy matters] well enough or 
fairly enough…”  In his analysis, Hetherington found that citizen trust in government was 
strongly related to support for government programs such as foreign aid and food stamps.  &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&1&It is important to keep in mind that in some cases the term trust is used differently in political science than the way 
Mayer et al. use the term. Sometimes the term trust in political science more resembles the psychological term 
“attitude” (e.g. Hetherington, 1998). In other cases, the term trust more resembles Mayer et al.’s trustworthiness 
construct (e.g. Blind 2006). Regardless, usage of the term is similar enough between the political science research 
and the Mayer et al. research that we use the concept interchangeably.&
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Mayer et al. (p. 718) define benevolence as “the extent to which a trustee is believed to 
want to do good for the trustor.”  Essentially, benevolence is a trustor’s perception that a person 
or organization cares about the trustor.  A trustor might believe that a trustee has high ability, 
but, if a trustor does not believe that the trustee wants to do good for the trustor then his or her 
trust is clearly diminished.  As Davis et al. (2000, p. 566) note, “Benevolence represents a 
positive personal orientation of the trustee to the trustor.”  They suggest that in a business 
context, at the individual level, benevolence might manifest for an employee (the trustor) when a 
manager (the trustee) is willing to “go out of his or her way” for the employee.  
From an organizational standpoint, the degree to which a person or persons believes a 
business or government is trustworthy, and therefore trusts the business or government, should 
also depend on the benevolence of the organization in question.  From Mayer and colleague’s 
perspective (2007), benevolence might not be a major factor in trust in a business since, after all, 
what business can afford to be truly benevolent?  Yet, clearly, the benevolence of a government, 
the degree to which a trustor believes that a government wants to do good for the citizens, should 
have an impact on citizen trust.  If a government seems uncaring about the day-to-day travails of 
its citizenry, citizen willingness to trust that government should be hampered.  On the other hand, 
if a government is perceived as caring and responsive to the needs of its citizens, it makes sense 
that the citizens might afford the government more trust.  
As Blind (2006) notes, in many developed nations where trust is lowest, citizens 
commonly report that their government does not care about their needs (also see Dalton, 2005).  
Along these lines, Warren (1999) suggests that governments are better trusted when they take on 
the interests of their citizens.  Warren (2006) also notes that citizen perceptions of government 
sincerity are helpful in generating government level trust.  Miller (1974, p. 951) made a similar 
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point when he found that the perception a government “does not function for [the citizens]” is 
associated with distrust. He also points out that one way to reduce citizen distrust in government 
is for a government to generate policies that are more clearly and obviously responsive to the 
needs of the citizenry.  Miller and Listhaug (1990) came to a similar conclusion in their 
comparative analysis between Sweden, Norway, and the United States. They found that 
governments that have a more flexible party system (as opposed to a rigid two party system) are 
often more trusted because the citizenry believes that at least some element of the government, 
even if it is a very small party, cares about their specific needs.  
The final element of Mayer’s trustworthiness construct is integrity.  Mayer et al. (1995, p. 
719) define integrity as “the trustor’s perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that 
the trustor finds acceptable.”  This concept does not imply that the trustor and trustee have 
exactly the same set of principles; rather, this definition indicates that the trustor adheres to some 
consistent moral code and is generally fair and just (e.g. Colquitt et al., 2007).  As Davis et al. 
(2000, p. 567) put it, “Such factors as consistency, a reputation for honesty, and fairness all 
contribute to the … perception of integrity.”  From an organizational standpoint, the degree to 
which a person or persons believes a business or government is trustworthy, and therefore trusts 
the business or government, should also depend on the integrity of the organization in question.  
From the perspective of a business, perceptions of integrity are probably based on a company’s 
fulfillment of contractual obligations and a general abiding by business rules and norms. 
For a government, perceptions of integrity are probably based upon similar perceptions.  
In addition, a sense that a government operates within the rules it has created and avoids 
corruption probably has an impact on integrity and subsequent trust.  Research regarding 
perceptions of government corruption support Mayer et al.’s claims about the impact of integrity 
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(or lack thereof) on citizen trust in government.  Multiple research perspectives note that scandal 
and corruption have devastating impacts on reports of trust in government.  Warren (2006) for 
example, notes that corruption is corrosive, undermines democracy, and creates cynicism. 
Research by Morris and Klesner (2010) support this notion.  They found that not only does 
government level corruption harm reports of trust in government but it also produces increased 
corruption creating a vicious cycle of decreased trust and increased corruption.  Morris and 
Klesener also point out that exposure to political scandal reduces political trust and has even 
been linked to voter apathy in both the U.S. (Peters & Welsh, 1980) and Mexico (McCann & 
Dominguez, 1998).  Similarly, Dalton (2005) reports that multiple research lines blame 
government level trust decreases over the last decades on political scandal.  
Trust, Risks Taking, Outcomes, and Practical Application 
Within the Mayer et al. framework, the more trustworthy a trustee is, presumably the 
more a trustor will be willing to be vulnerable to that person (or organization). In our case, the 
more trustworthy a government is, the more trust a trustor should have in his or her government 
in the sense that the trustor should be willing to take on more risk when a risk taking situation 
presents itself. For example, strong trust in a government might manifest itself in risk taking 
actions such as general support for a government as well as practical action such as voting. 
Presumably, as detailed by the model framework, after a person engages in some kind of risk 
taking behavior (such as casting a vote to keep a government in power), the outcome of that risk 
taking situation should feedback and update subsequent perceptions of, in this case a 
government’s, trustworthiness.  
A relevant example of this framework of trust generation relates to a recent policy 
directive of the Obama Administration. In June 2012, the United States (U.S.) government 
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implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). Under the DACA, illegal 
immigrants who were brought into the United States as children, who have graduated from U.S. 
schools, and who meet other requirements can obtain official deferment of deportation from the 
U.S. government (“Deferred action for,” 2013).  But, in order to do so, they must first make 
themselves very vulnerable by identifying themselves to the government, trusting that the 
government will honor its promise and not immediately deport them. The degree to which such 
“illegal” individuals believe that the American government is trustworthy, that is, possesses 
ability, benevolence, and integrity, should predict the degree to which they trust the government 
of the United States and the degree to which they will be willing to take a risk and operate within 
the bounds of the DACA framework.  
Theoretical Debate Regarding Mayer et al’s Model 
While this section has explained the distinctions between ability, benevolence, and 
integrity, and their theoretically unique impacts on trust, it is important to note that there is some 
debate in the literature regarding the unique contributions of each trustworthiness factor on trust. 
Some empirical analyses (e.g. Jarvenpaa, Knoll, & Leidner, 1998; Mayer & Gavin, 2005) have 
found that integrity and benevolence do not uniquely contribute to trust. For example, Mayer and 
Gavin (2005), in a study regarding factory workers’ trust in leadership, found that benevolence 
did not uniquely predict trust, while ability and integrity were significant contributors to trust. 
Mayer and Gavin suggested that this was likely due to multicollinearity among the 
trustworthiness survey items. On the other hand Colquitt, Scott, and Lepine (2007), in a meta 
analysis of dozens of papers on trust, found that each trustworthiness factor did have a unique 
impact on trust. Ultimately, this matter has not been resolved in the literature. Our analyses will 
specifically examine this matter in hopes of bringing further clarity to the literature on this point.   
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The Countries in Our Analysis 
As noted, our analysis specifically examines whether the Mayer et al. framework is 
appropriate for understanding and predicting citizen trust in government, where we model citizen 
self-reports of trust in government in the African nations of Senegal, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and 
Mali. We selected these nations both because of their geographic proximity in the Western 
Trans-Sahel region (Figure 2) and also because of their differences in terms of history, 
perception of democracy, and the adherence to governance.  By separately modeling four 
countries, which represent different governmental, political, and cultural variants, we are able to 
assess how robust the Mayer et al. framework is and whether our results are likely to be 
generalizable or country-specific.  Hence, before discussing methods and results, it is useful to 
know a bit about the history, geography, and culture of each country to put the results in 
perspective. 
Senegal.  A former French colony, Senegal gained its independence from France in 1960.  
It is a constitutional republic whose civil law system is derived from French law (CIA World 
Factbook, 2013).  Senegal’s population is approximately 13 million and its citizenry is more than 
90 percent Muslim.  The capital, Dakar, is the westernmost point in Africa, and the country is 
roughly the size of South Dakota. 
Senegal is considered one of the most Westernized countries of Africa and, with the 
country located along historical trading routes, the Senegalese people have thrived throughout 
their history and are often praised for their assertiveness.  Indeed, because of their tenacious 
nature and focus on business the Senegalese are often referred to as “the New Yorkers of Africa 
with a French accent” (Richmond & Gestrin, 2010).  While its political system has not always 
been free of scandals, Senegal has never had a coup, a fate that has befallen many other African 
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countries. Senegal places great importance and pride in being a stable democratic country and it 
has had successful peaceful transitions of power in 2000 and again in 2012 after a very contested 
election. 
Nigeria.  A former British colony, Nigeria gained its independence in 1960.  It is a 
federal republic with a mixed legal system derived from English common law, Islamic law in the 
northern states, and traditional law (CIA World Factbook, 2013).  Nigeria’s population exceeds 
150 million and its citizenry is approximately 50 percent Muslim, 40 percent Christian, and 10 
percent other religions.  Lagos is the largest city in Nigeria with a population of over 11 million 
and the country is roughly the combined size of California and Nevada.   
Nigeria’s rich resources and strong relationships with the United States, China, and 
Europe might lead one to believe its future is bright, particularly because the country’s rich 
natural resources and an infrastructure that has been developed at levels far superior to other 
African countries in the region.  However, Nigeria’s rampant poverty, internal government strife, 
bloody coups and assassinations, and flawed elections have impeded the country’s development.  
Indeed, the wealth of resources has created a vicious circle where, with no sense of nationality, 
corruption in Nigeria has actually restricted growth (Rabasa et al., 2007). 
Although Nigeria is proximate to Senegal (in terms of locations on the African continent; 
the distance from Lagos to Dakar is roughly 2,000 miles), the historical paths of the two 
countries are very different.  For example, while the Senegalese have a unified national identity, 
Nigeria is a very religiously divided country with a great amount of turmoil and distrust between 
Islamic citizens in the north and Christians in the south.  This division is at least partly 
attributable to Nigeria’s borders that were established by Europeans to facilitate access to the 
Niger delta.  As a result, the fear of one religious group dominating the other was so serious that 
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independence from Britain in 1960 was never truly favored by the citizens of Nigeria (Campbell, 
2010). 
Burkina Faso.  Like Senegal, Burkina Faso is a former French colony that gained its 
independence in 1960.  It is a parliamentary republic whose civil law system is derived from 
French law and customary law (CIA World Factbook, 2013).  Burkina’s population is about 17 
million and is roughly the size of Nevada.  It is located about half way in between Senegal and 
Nigeria in the Sahel region of Africa.  The religious make-up of its citizenry is approximately 60 
percent Muslim, 25 percent Christian, and 15 percent other.   
Burkina Faso has had a tumultuous history, with repeated military coups in the 1970s and 
1980s, and it is currently one of the poorest of the countries in the Sahel, which means it is 
among the poorest in the world.  However, with its main exports of cotton and gold, and as the 
first African country to receive World Bank/IMF funding and debt relief, it is beginning to show 
signs of economic improvement (CIA World Factbook, 2013).  Burkina Faso is one of four 
countries in Africa that recognize the sovereignty of Taiwan.  As one would expect, this point of 
fact remains controversial with China and, as a result, relations have been terminated between 
the two countries and economic advancement has subsequently suffered (“U.S. relations with,” 
2012). 
Mali.  Also a former French colony that gained its independence in 1960, Mali’s 
population is estimated to be slightly more than 15 million and the country is roughly twice the 
size of Texas.  Mali has a republican form of government whose civil law system based on 
French law and customary law (CIA World Factbook, 2013).  The southern part of Mali is 
located between Senegal and Burkina Faso in the Sahel region, while the northern part of the 
country extends well into the Sahara desert.  The country is almost 95 percent Muslim.   
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Mali has had a slow start since it became an independent country.  Landlocked, it is 
considered one of the poorest countries in the world, and it was not until the early 1990s that 
Mali began to enjoy a free society governed by freely elected officials.  However, after the 
collection of our data, Mali had a coup in which their army, displeased with the government’s 
management of a Tuareg rebellion, overthrew their president in March of 2012.  Subsequently 
the situation in northern Mali deteriorated to the extent that extremist forces established a 
foothold in the region and then expanded their presence throughout the northern half of the 
country.  With French military assistance, as of this writing, the northern part of the country has 
been retaken and democratic elections are scheduled for mid-2013 (CIA World Factbook, 2013).  
Methods 
Based on surveys fielded in late 2010, our data consists of almost 140 survey questions 
asked of a cross-section of people in each our four countries: Nigeria, Senegal, Burkina Faso, 
and Mali.  The questions, which are predominantly 4- and 5-point Likert scale-based, focus on 
quality of life, governance, politics, security, social tolerance, and opinions about international 
relations.  The surveys were designed following standard survey principles (e.g., Dillman, 2006; 
Groves, et al., 2004).  Upon completion of instrument design, the surveys underwent extensive 
pre-testing in the field prior to their use in the actual 2010 data collection effort.   
Survey respondents were selected via a clustered and stratified sampling scheme 
designed to collect a nationally representative sample of the population with a margin of error of 
3 percent or less.  The target population for the survey was adults aged 18 and over.  The survey 
data were collected via face-to-face interviews conducted by local survey companies, using 
members of the local population, so interviewers were culturally sensitive and fluent in the local 
dialect(s).  The final sample sizes are: 3,770 respondents in Nigeria, 1,661 respondents in 
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Senegal, 1,481 respondents in Burkina Faso, and 1,874 respondents in Mali.  With minor 
exceptions, the surveys asked the same questions across all four countries (translated into the 
local languages and dialects), which allows us to compare and contrast the results across the four 
countries. 
Data Analytic Strategy: Factor Analysis 
Surveys are routinely used to gain insight into population attitudes, perceptions, and 
beliefs. However, these attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs often manifest as latent traits that are 
incompletely measured via single survey questions.  That is, individual survey questions are 
often imperfect measures of the population traits of interest and so there is frequently a need to 
use multiple survey questions to characterize and measure complex constructs. 
Factor analysis is a method for identifying latent traits from question-level survey data.  It 
is useful in survey analysis whenever the phenomenon of interest is not directly measurable via a 
single question.  In such situations, it is necessary to ask a series of questions about the 
phenomenon and then appropriately combine the resulting responses into a single measure or 
“factor.”  Such factors, then, become the observed measures of the unobservable or latent 
phenomenon. 
Prior to conducting factor analysis, we first cleaned and coded the survey data, and then 
we imputed a small number of missing values in order to prepare the data.  Each of these steps 
was non-trivial, but we do not include a discussion here due to space constraints, though we 
stress that we used standard approaches and methods (see, e.g., Chapter 10 of Groves, et al., 
2009).  The most important point to make is that factor analysis can only be done with complete 
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data and thus imputation2 can be a critical step to complete prior to doing factor analysis 
(Mulaik, 2010).   
For our data, approximately six percent of the data was missing (due, for example, to 
respondents refusing or failing to answer one or more questions), but they were spread 
throughout the data.  If we had only used complete records we would have had to eliminate 60 
percent of the respondents.  Imputation allowed us to use all the data and subsequent sensitivity 
analyses demonstrated that our imputation assumptions had no practical effect on the factor 
analysis and subsequent model results. 
We applied factor analysis to our survey data using the R statistical package (R Core 
Team, 2012). In particular, we used the factanal function in the base package to derive and 
rotate the loadings (using the varimax rotation) and we used parallel analysis as coded in the 
fa.parallel function of the R psych package (Revelle, 2011) to determine the number of 
factors.  Our factors were calculated as linear combinations of the survey question responses 
weighted by the loadings.  To minimize multicollinearity in the models, we only kept questions 
with loadings less than -0.4 or greater than 0.4 and we only allowed questions to be in at most 
one factor (where the decision was made subjectively taking into account the magnitude of the 
loadings and where the variable most naturally seemed to fit).  See Fricker, Kulzy, and Appleget 
(2012) for additional detail. 
Our initial intent was to explore whether or not the survey data would produce factors 
that would, at least roughly, mirror the Mayer et al. constructs previously described. That is, we 
explored whether or not the factor analysis would produce factors that would appear to represent &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&2&Imputation&is&withinFsample&inference&for&itemFlevel&missing&data.&&There&are&a&number&of&standard&techniques&used&with&survey&data,&all&of&which&infer&values&for&missing&survey&responses&using&other&information&from&within&the&sample&data.&&For&this&research,&we&used&nearest&neighbor&hot&deck&imputation&as&implemented&in&the&StatMatch&package&of&R&(D’Orazio,&2012).&
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trustworthiness constructs such as ability, benevolence, and integrity as well as trust in 
government and propensity to trust constructs.  Given that the factor analysis did produce factors 
that appear to represent the Mayer et al framework (to be discussed in the following sections), 
we then conducted a regression analysis to assess the impact of factors like ability, benevolence, 
and integrity (and any others that might arise) on trust in government.  
Results 
 Trust in Government 
 Our factor analysis results provided what amounts to three factors that appear to 
characterize elements of trust in government. Specifically, our results provided three 
governance-related trust factors that we refer to as Trust in Government Policy Makers, Trust in 
Government Agencies, and Trust in Government (and which will be the dependent variables in 
our regression models discussed subsequently).  These three factors were derived from (up to) 12 
survey questions and, as shown in Table 1, they vary in terms of how they are defined across the 
four countries.  In Table 1, the numbers in the table are the loadings that correspond to each of 
the questions on the left and the boxes show how the factors are defined in terms of the questions 
and associated loadings (where small loadings are suppressed for reading clarity). 
In Table 1 we see that for Nigeria and Senegal the questions coalesce into two separate 
factors: Trust in Policy Makers (“TiPM”) and Trust in Government Agencies (“TiGA”).  The 
former are formed from questions about the country's president and prime minister while the 
latter is comprised of four to six questions asking about the respondent's trust in a series of 
government organizations and agencies.  Contrasting Nigeria with Senegal, we see a number of 
similarities and differences.  In particular, Senegal’s Trust in Policy Makers factor also includes 
trust in the National Assembly while its Trust in Agencies factor does not include this question 
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or the question on trust in political parties.  In contrast, in Burkina Faso and Mali all or almost all 
of the questions come together in one factor that captures Trust in (all of the) Government 
(“TiG”).  There are two differences between the factors for these two countries.  The most 
obvious is that Burkina Faso also includes trust in religious leaders in the factor as well as 
respondents’ opinions about satisfaction with and stability of democracy in their country.  Less 
obvious is that the loadings for Mali place less emphasis on political parties, armed forces, courts 
and judges, and local police and government. 
The differences in Table 1 are consistent with the histories and cultures of the countries.   
For example, Senegalese and Nigerians distinguish between their heads of state, such as 
president and prime minister, and the other entities that make up the government.  In the case of 
Senegal, even though their first two presidents were in power for 20 years each, one of the 
authors of this manuscript has, through extensive experience in the region, observed that the 
culture of the country is to value and respect the role of the president.  In Nigeria, on the other 
hand, the president is much more visible because the presidency alternates between the northern 
and southern halves of the country.  Thus the populace seems to be accustomed to separating 
what is accomplished by their local government agencies in their respective states from the head 
of the national government. 
In contrast, because Burkina Faso is still a country in a fledgling state, where the 
population may not yet distinguish between levels of government, it is not surprising that the 
president and the government agencies combine into a single factor.  For Mali, although the 
country had been hailed by some as the model of democracy, the country has a history of coups 
going back to 1968, 1991, and again most recently in 2012 (“Mali profile,” 2013).  Because of 
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this, the populace may not make much of a distinction between the head of state and other levels 
of government since the entire government can change overnight via coup. 
Trustworthiness Components. 
 In addition to the Trust in Government factors, Tables 2 through 4 show the factors 
grouped by the Mayer et al. categories of propensity to trust, benevolence/integrity, and ability. 
Not shown in these Tables, due to space constraints, are those questions and factors derived from 
the survey data that we did not a priori select as fitting into any of the Mayer et al. categories.  
We discuss those that are statistically significant in the modeling results.  
 Beginning with the simplest, Table 2 shows what we believe is at least a rough 
approximation of Mayer et al’s, Trustor Propensity factor for all four countries. Mayer et al. 
(1995, p. 715) define propensity to trust as "the general willingness to trust others" and they 
suggest it influences “how much trust one has for a trustee prior to data.” Measuring and 
identifying such a factor is not only useful from the standpoint of assessing the Mayer et al. 
model, but it may also provide interesting insights into general characteristics of a country's 
population, particularly how trusting that population may be of their government in the absence 
of direct information (data) about the government in terms of the other components of 
trustworthiness. 
The similarity in the definitions of the trustor propensity factor across all four countries is 
striking.  Not only are they constructed of the same questions but the factor loadings are quite 
similar; this in spite of the fact that the surveys and subsequent factor analyses were conducted 
completely independently.  This suggests the underlying trustor propensity construct is robust. 
 Table 3 shows a series of factors that appear to capture, at least roughly, the 
Integrity/Benevolence concepts described by Mayer et al. For example, we would expect any 
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integrity factor to include items regarding government adherence to laws. The factors in Table 3 
clearly support this notion (though they also clearly vary by country as discussed below). 
Similarly, we would expect any benevolence factor to provide some indication of a perception 
that a government cares about the people. These factors seem to bear this out. One important 
point to emphasize is, as noted earlier, there is some debate in the literature regarding the exact 
nature of the integrity and benevolence constructs with some suggesting that the two might not 
be so distinct. The factors in Table 3 seem to support the notion that there is probably some 
blurring of the constructs.  
Overall, in this set of factors we see both similarities and differences across all the 
countries.  For example, all four countries have a Free and Fair Society factor, but they are all 
made up of different subsets of questions 19 through 24.  The Democracy factor is the same for 
Senegal and Mali, but for Nigeria it is comprised of an additional two questions that were unique 
to the Nigeria survey.  And, Burkina Faso does not have a separate Democracy factor because 
questions 1 and 2 were included in Burkina’s Trust in Government factor (see Table 1). 
 Table 4 shows what we believe amounts to a set of Ability factors. As described by 
Mayer et al., we would expect any ability factor to have items related to government competence 
or ability to efficiently conduct the people’s business. Cleary the factors in Table 4 seem to 
mirror this concept.  
As with the previously defined factors, here too we see similarities and differences 
between the countries.  In particular, the various infrastructure questions (about education, health 
care, water, roads, and electricity) group in various ways reflecting how the citizens of each 
country view these services.  Burkina Faso is most different from the other countries, where here 
the factors are formed in terms of the current status of services and the changes in those services 
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over the previous year.  This difference, although subtle, is very telling about the current state of 
Burkina Faso, which does not have the natural resources of Nigeria nor is it situated along the 
historical trading routes of Senegal, and which have resulted in well-developed infrastructure in 
Nigeria and Senegal that has been in place for decades.  In contrast, Burkina Faso is a much 
poorer country that has lagged in infrastructure development.  However, it “has made significant 
progress in developing its infrastructure in recent years” (Briceño-Garmendia & Domínguez-
Torres, 2011, p. 1).  Thus, while Nigerians, Senegalese, and Malians view infrastructure in terms 
of its various constituent parts, the Burkinabes are still seeing significant change in their 
infrastructure and thus view it temporally: the current state of overall infrastructure versus how it 
has changed in the past year. 
All four countries also have a Security Concerns factor comprised of various subsets of 
questions 41 through 46.  In addition to the infrastructure-related and Security Concerns factors, 
an economics factor coalesces for Nigeria and Burkina Faso, where question 41 groups with 
ethnic or border concerns respectively.  This correctly captures the fact that Nigerians see 
economic prosperity tied to ethnic relations, which is likely a proxy for the religious and north-
south tensions in the country (see, for example, Pate, 2012 and Ofodile, 2001).  Similarly, 
Burkinabe’s seem to see their economic prosperity as tied in with border security, where given 
current events in Mali this association that has likely increased since this data was collected in 
late 2010. 
Model Fitting 
The derived factors, particularly the Trust in Government factors, because they are linear 
combinations of survey questions, turn out to be normally distributed.  Thus, we used 
multivariate linear regression to fit our models, where the idea is to model trust in government as 
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a function of the other derived factors (and those survey questions that did not enter into any of 
the factors we reported).  In so doing, we did not combine the individual factors within each of 
Mayer et al.’s categories but included them in the model as separate covariates.  The reason we 
did not further group the factors into the Mayer et al. trustworthiness constructs (ability, 
benevolence, integrity, as well as trustor propensity) is that, should it have been appropriate to so 
group them, those groupings would have resulted from the factor analysis.  Since they did not 
occur, and because each of the factors represents a distinct latent trait in the population, we kept 
them as separate (possible) covariates.  
Along with having to incorporate the sampling weights that account for an unequal 
probability of respondent selection, model estimation had to also account for the complex 
sampling design described earlier. Thus, the multiple regression models were fit using svyglm in 
the R survey package.  See Montgomery et al. (2006) for an introduction to multiple regression; 
see Lumley (2010) for the details of the R survey package and fitting regression models to data 
arising from complex sampling designs. 
A backwards elimination stepwise approach was used to fit the models in which 
covariates with the highest p-values were successively eliminated until all the remaining 
variables had p-values less than 0.05.  Exceptions to this are: (1) main effects were kept in 
regardless of p-value if they were part of a statistically significant interaction term, and (2) 
demographic variables were kept in all the models in order to first control for these effects prior 
to assessing the significance of the other variables.  The demographic variables are gender, age, 
ethnicity, education, income, location (urban/rural), and whether the respondent’s political party 
was in or out of power. 
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Model Fitting Results 
We fit six Trust in Government models using the Trust factors in Table 1 as the 
dependent variables.  Possible independent variables consisted of the Ability, 
Integrity/Benevolence, and Trustor Propensity factors defined in Tables 2 through 4, as well as 
another 15 to 18 factors (depending on country) derived from the remaining 90 questions, and all 
the questions that did not coalesce into one of the factors.  To the extent feasible with the data, 
important interaction terms were fit, generally based on demographics such as gender, religion, 
and location (urbanicity), and those that were significant kept in the model. 
Table 5 summarizes the modeling results where, for the purposes of simplifying the 
display, we have left out the covariate values and focused on displaying the significance (or lack 
thereof) of each of the independent variables.  In so doing, we have further simplified the display 
by “rolling up” the effects of interaction terms into the main terms by showing the most 
significant effect (whether it was the main effect or the interaction) by the main terms.  We do 
this because our goal here is not to interpret the six specific models, but rather to assess whether 
the Mayer et al. model formulation is appropriate and to compare and contrast the model terms 
across the four countries. 
Table 5 shows that, broadly speaking, the Mayer et al. model formulation is appropriate 
across all six models and all four countries in the sense that most of the significant terms in the 
models fall under either the ability or integrity/benevolence categories as posited by Mayer et al.  
Furthermore, out of an additional 15 to 18 factors (depending on country) that we did not 
initially classify under either the Ability or Integrity/Benevolence categories, six of those are also 
significant in one or more of the six models (see the italicized covariates).  However, as Table 5 
shows, in hindsight we recognized that three of the factors should have been categorized under 
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one of the Mayer et al. categories.  For example, the Assistance/Investment from Other Countries 
factor is comprised of questions such as “How much do you think [country] helps develop the 
economy through investment?” and is an important governmental ability for countries that do 
require external assistance.  Thus, ultimately, there were only three significant “non-Mayer” 
factors (out of the additional 15 to 18 factors) suggesting that, at least for the data available from 
our surveys, the Mayer et al. ability and benevolence/integrity categories encompass most of the 
covariates significantly associated with governmental trust. 
Table 5 also shows that in each model ability and integrity/benevolence are uniquely 
defined both by the particular country and by the level of government.  For example, ability in 
Mali consists of effective education systems and health care infrastructure and attracting external 
aid and investment, while in Burkina Faso governmental ability is much more broadly defined.  
In addition, when looking at the TiGA and TiPM models for Nigeria and Senegal we see that 
citizens’ trust in government policy makers and government agencies are functions of different 
covariates, particularly in the ability category.  Specifically, when compared to policy makers, 
citizens’ trust of government agencies is a function of abilities that are more focused on 
infrastructure, while when it comes to integrity and benevolence there is greater similarity in the 
covariates that affect citizens’ trust in agencies and policy makers.  Of course, there are 
important detail differences.  For example, Nigerian citizens’ trust of policy makers is a function 
of religion and religious law while this same factor does not enter into citizens’ trust of agencies.  
In contrast, the Senegalese trust in government agencies is a function of ethnic/religious relations 
and tolerance in society, but trust in policy makers is not.  
Trustor propensity is significant in only three of the six models, where it is significant in 
both of the TiG models, one of the TiGA models, and neither of the TiPM models.  Given the 
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small number of models, it’s impossible to determine whether this pattern is significant or just an 
artifact of our particular data.  Furthermore, our Trustor Propensity factor is derived from five 
questions (Table 2) that were conveniently available in our survey data but that were not 
designed, much less validated, as measures of trust propensity.  Thus, it is quite possible that 
there are better trust propensity scales that would perform more effectively in the models.  
Nonetheless, these results at least partially support the trustor propensity term in the Mayer et al. 
model. 
We note that all of the models in Table 5 have quite respectable R2 values that range from 
almost 0.3 to just above 0.4.  While this means that more than half the variance in the data is 
unexplained by the models, it is important to remember that our models are based on survey-
based opinion data, and these R2 values are higher than what we expected prior to fitting the 
models.  The R2 values are even more impressive given that the surveys we used were not 
designed for the purpose of testing the Mayer et al. model.  This suggests that improvements in 
the questions leading to more and perhaps better-defined factors could potentially result in higher 
R2 values and improved model fits. 
Discussion 
Our fundamental finding is that our data and analyses support the Mayer et al. model.  
This is in spite of the fact that the original model was posed as a model of trust between 
individuals and we have applied it to individuals' trust in an organizational-level entity – 
government.  That said, our results also suggest some modifications to the Mayer et al. model 
which we illustrate in a revised model based on a hybrid of our results and Mayer et al.’s 
framework (Figure 3).  
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We hypothesize that governmental ability has two main facets.  The first facet is internal 
ability, defined as those skills and competencies necessary to provide domestic services desired 
by citizens, such as essential infrastructure, effectively managing the country’s economy, 
providing for individual safety and security, etc.  The second facet is external ability, defined as 
those skills and competencies necessary for governing the country within the international 
community, such as maintaining a national security apparatus, attracting external aid as 
necessary, etc. 
Similarly, we hypothesize that governmental benevolence/integrity also has two main 
facets.  The first facet is organizational benevolence/integrity, which is defined as the extent to 
which the government adheres to a set of acceptable principles and it is operated in a manner that 
is good for the country.  For example, the government operates according to democratic 
principles, it functions in an open and transparent manner, etc.  The second facet is societal 
benevolence/integrity, which is defined as the extent to which the government promotes and 
advances societal conditions and principles that are good for and desired by the citizenry.  For 
example, the government promotes a society that is free and fair, peaceful and tolerant, etc. 
In addition, our results suggest that there may be a third factor or set of factors that affect 
governmental trust.  Unfortunately, there were not enough significant covariates in our model to 
fully define it or them, but we hypothesize that they are related to governmental reputation.  As 
with ability and benevolence/integrity, we posit that there may be two facets to governmental 
reputation.  The first facet is the government’s international reputation, which is defined as the 
estimation in which the country and its government is held by the international community, 
including other countries and governments and the people of other countries.  For example, it is 
the perception of whether the government conducts effective international relations, the 
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country’s status among the world’s nations, etc.  The second facet is the government’s domestic 
reputation, which is defined as the estimation in which the government is held by the country’s 
citizenry.  This is reputation for effective governance, as opposed to for example, whether or not 
it is actually effective.  Whether this facet can be measured separately from ability and 
benevolence/integrity is an open question.   
The role of reputation in trust in government is potentially an important one because it is 
likely that most citizens have limited personal interaction with their government.   That is, unlike 
in the Mayer et al. interpersonal model in which individuals are likely to have multiple 
opportunities to iterate around the loop shown in Figure 1 and develop trust as a result of direct, 
repeated interaction, most citizens will likely have much less such interaction with their 
government.  Because of this, we expect that individuals will likely base at least some of their 
trust in government on the government’s reputation as determined via mass media, interaction 
with family, friends, and colleagues, etc.  Furthermore, there are likely to be aspects of ability, 
benevolence, and integrity that certain citizens are simply unable to observe or experience.  In 
these cases, the only assessment an individual will be able to make, both of how much to trust 
the government and how much risk is inherent in some action, may be mainly based on 
reputation. 
This additional reputation component of trustworthiness is consistent with some of the 
popular business management literature.  For example, Covey and Merrill (2006) say that trust is 
based on four “cores”: integrity, intent, capabilities, and results.  The first three map directly to 
Mayer et al.’s integrity, benevolence, and ability components of trustworthiness.  For the fourth, 
their results core, Covey and Merrill say it “refers to our track record, our performance, our 
getting the right things done.  …when we achieve the results we promised, we establish a 
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positive reputation of performing … and our reputation precedes us” (p. 55).  They go on to say 
that “Results are the fruits—the visible, tangible, measurable outcomes that are most easily seen 
and evaluated by others” (p. 56).  In this regard, the reputation component in Figure 3 differs 
slightly, as reputation is the result of both directly observable outcomes and unobserved or 
unobservable outcomes.  The latter aspect is important because unobserved outcomes may be 
correct, actual outcomes, say as related via a responsible news medium, and they may also be 
incorrect, untrue or distorted outcomes, perhaps reported in other types of mass or social media, 
or that are spread via rumor, etc.  Reputation is also a function of the trustor’s viewpoint and 
disposition. 
Returning to our model results, our empirical work suggests that the Mayer et al. model is 
an extremely helpful organizational framework for understanding and predicting citizen trust in 
government. Of course, citizens of different countries have specific local concerns and needs that 
impact their trust ratings. The important point here, however, is that the Mayer et al. model is 
robust to capturing these nuances. In particular, when thinking about trust, we find that just 
within our four countries some separate trust in their individual leaders from trust in broader 
governmental institutions while others do not distinguish between the two.  Similarly, while this 
research confirms that Mayer et al.’s categories of ability, benevolence, and integrity are 
applicable, it also shows that each of these is also a country-specific construct composed of those 
things each citizenry judges relevant and important to its society.   
In some sense this brings us full-circle back to Combs and Blincoe’s assertion that 
“ability varies from domain to domain and situation to situation,” although what we find with 
trust in government is that the definition of ability, benevolence, and integrity vary from country 
to country, as does the definition of “trust in government.”  This finding thus suggests a series of 
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future research opportunities.  One important line of research is better defining survey items and 
scales from which to derive valid measures of the various aspects of ability, benevolence, 
integrity, and reputation.  Another line of research is further evaluating whether or not reputation 
is an important aspect of the model and, if so, whether that is the correct characterization of the 
term.  Then, given these results, political scientists, organizational theorists, and international 
relations experts will likely be interested in comparing and contrasting trust in government 
models across various countries, societies, and governmental structures. 
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Note: Three different types of government trust factors defined from 12 questions for the 
four countries.  The numbers in the table are the loadings that correspond to each of the 
questions on the left.  The boxes show the factor definitions in terms of their constituent 
questions and associated loadings. &&&&&&&&&&&&&






Note: Trustor Propensity factor definitions.  The numbers in the table are the loadings that 
correspond to each of the questions on the left and the boxes show the factor definitions in 
terms of their constituent questions and associated loadings. &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&






Note: Integrity/Benevolence factor definitions.  The numbers in the table are the loadings that 
correspond to each of the questions on the left and the boxes show the factor definitions in 
terms of their constituent questions and associated loadings. &&&&&&&&&&&






Note: Ability factor definitions.  The numbers in the table are the loadings that correspond to 
each of the questions on the left and the boxes show the factor definitions in terms of their 
constituent questions and associated loadings. &&&






Note: Results from Trust in Government (“TiG”) models for Mali and Burkina Faso and 
Trust in Government Agencies (“TiGA”) and Trust in Policy Maker (“TiPM”) models for 
Nigeria and Senegal.  The stars show which independent variables were significant predictors 
of trust in government. &&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&














Figure 3: Revised Integrative Model of Governmental Trust. &
 
 
 
 
 
 
